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"[P]retty much all law," Holmes wrote in his dissent in Adkins 
v. Children's Hospital, 1 "consists in forbidding men to do some 
things they want to do .... " The Constitution is no exception. It 
is, of course, in a very important sense, also an empowering instru-
ment. But even there it simultaneously creates power and limits it 
by channelling the exercise of power through prescribed institutions 
and procedures. The recognition of the Constitution as law-and 
law as essentially restraint-immediately engages the preoccupation 
of modern constitutional scholarship, the exercise of constitutional 
judicial review. As with all law, the capacity of the Constitution to 
restrain depends upon its interpretation and application by human 
agents.2 The nature of the actual restraints felt by governing offi-
cials will turn on how those agents, the judges, understand and exe-
cute their job. 
Much of the recent writing on this subject discusses whether 
judges ought or (more commonly) ought not to interpret constitu-
tional rules as those rules were understood by the people who cre-
ated them.J Critics of originalism have launched a barrage of 
• Professor of Law, University of Connecticut, School of Law. This paper is a revi-
sion and development of one theme in a longer essay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in 
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 N.W. U.L. REV. 226 (1988), 
in which I deal generally with the difficulties which have been argued to exist in any form of 
adjudication which attempts to apply constitutional rules in the senses intended by their 
creators. 
I. 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
2. Judicial review, of course would have a restraining effect on the other branches even 
if it were entirely unrestrained. But in that case the Constitution would not be the source of 
the restraint (except insofar as it was believed to vest the unrestrained power in the judges.) 
The restraining power of the Constitution depends upon the regularity of its interpretation 
and application by the judges. See]. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SoURCES OF THE LAW 170-
72 (1963). The question then is converted to one about the restraints the Constitution im-
poses on the pronouncements of the judges. 
3. By "create" I mean to give the force of law. See infra text accompanying notes 12-
15. I will generally refer to these people as the "constitution-makers." I will not here discuss 
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objections to it, some going to its desirability and some to its practi-
cality. I plan here to discuss only one of those objections. It is, 
however, in a way, a threshold objection, for it is based on what 
turns out to be an assertion about what the Constitution is. It holds 
that it is inappropriate to be tied to the intentions of the constitu-
tion-makers because it is the Constitution, itself, which ought to 
control. It is not the intention of the constitution-makers but their 
product which is important. This position is summarized in an-
other Holmes epigram: "We do not inquire what the legislature 
meant; we ask only what the statute means."4 
My response to this objection is in two parts. First, we cannot 
conceive of language without associating it with some intention. 
Second, to choose an intention other than one fairly attributable to 
the constitution-makers is inconsistent with generally accepted 
ideas of what makes a constitution binding law. 
In considering the first point it is important to keep in mind the 
nature of language. Marks on paper or sound in the air mean noth-
ing by themselves. If we find some scratches on the bark of a tree or 
hear the leaves rustling in the wind we will not usually stop to con-
sider their meaning. Only when we suspect that some intelligence 
arranged the scratches or rustling to communicate a message will 
we behave differently.s When we see aggregations of letters and 
hear certain familiar sounds we suppose, based on long experience, 
there is some intelligence responsible for their presence. 6 Language 
how those people are identified or how their intentions are discerned, distilled, and combined. 
Rather, for the purpose of the limited question, with which I am concerned here, I assume 
that those intentions may be identified. That assumption is also entailed in the argument for 
the priority of the text. 
It must be emphasized that these are intentions about the extent and consequences 
within the legal system of the rule that the constitution-makers were creating. They are not 
intentions about the resolutions of specific controversies. 
Finally, I make here no assumption about the nature of those intentions. A finding that 
the Constitution was intended by the constitution-makers to impose only weak restraints on 
later decisionmakers would not be inconsistent with the position on the character of constitu-
tional rules for which I am arguing. 
4. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417,419 (1899). In 
constitutional scholarship this idea has been labelled "textualism." See Brest, The Miscon-
ceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204,205 (1980). Some expres-
sions of this position are found in Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. 
REV. 445, 459-60 (1984); Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, I 86-87 
(1981); Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 688 (1987); Schauer, An Essay on 
Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797, 809-12 (1982). 
5. See P. JUHL. INTERPRETATION: AN EssAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY 
CRITICISM 82-86 (1980); Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723, 725-
30 (1982). 
6. "Suppose that printing type thrown by the handful from the top of a tower fell to 
earth to form Racine's Atha/ie, what would be the conclusion? That some intelligence has 
governed the fall and the arrangement of the type. No other conclusion could sensibly be 
reached." J. DE MAISTRE, THE WORKS OF JOSEPH DE MAISTRE 152 (J. Lively ed. 1965). 
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meaning independent of some human intention, real or postulated, 
does not exist. 
This is not to say that we always must have reference to the 
actual intention of the writer. Nothing is more common than to 
encounter words about whose origin we are, in fact, ignorant and, 
indeed, uninterested. For example, when we see a sign with the 
words "Do Not Enter," we feel no difficulty in saying we know the 
words' meaning and in acting on that meaning. 1 But this is because 
we have a long experience of seeing and hearing human beings use 
those words in connection with a particular intention. So, in this 
case it is not quite right to say that the words have a meaning in-
dependent of any intention. Rather we suppose that someone 
posted the sign with the ordinary intention associated with those 
words. We take the sign to employ the words' "standard meaning," 
standard in the sense that people, in fact, most frequently use them 
in order to communicate that meaning.s 
Usually the standard meaning coincides with the meaning in-
tended by the actual author. It is a tautology that people ordinarily 
use words in the ordinary way. But this sensible way of dealing 
with language when we know nothing of the history of its creation 
will usually be abandoned when we do know something about the 
intention with which the words were uttered, if that intention con-
flicts with the standard meaning that we would provisionally assign 
in the absence of that knowledge.9 This is only because we have 
7. See Graff, "Keep Off the Gross, " "Drop Dead," and Other Indeterminacies: A Re-
sponse to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV. 405, 407 (1982). 
8. /d. at 407-08; see a/so E. HIRSCH, THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION 62-63 (1976); 
Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL REV. 377 (1987). Some of the literature would make the same 
point by saying that the words, themselves, have a "meaning" (what I am calling the stan-
dard meaning) independent of any intention with which they are uttered. See, e.g., C. AL-
TIERI, ACT AND QUALITY 70 (1981) (discussing Strawson); Cartwright, Propositions, in 
ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY 81, 93-95 (R. Butler ed. 1962); Davidson, A Nice Derangement of 
Epitaphs, in TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF DoN-
ALD DAVIDSON 433, 434 (E. LePore ed. 1986). Other writes have made the same distinction 
using different terms. For example H.P. Grice distinguishes between "timeless meaning" 
(standard meaning) and "occasion-meaning" (intended meaning). Grice, Utterer's Meaning 
and Intentions, 78 PHIL. REV. 147, 147-50 (1969). See also Moore, supra note 4, at 248 
(distinguishing sentence-meaning, utterance-meaning and speaker's meaning). I do not be-
lieve anything in my argument turns on the particular terminology employed. 
9. For example, a normal speaker of American English finding the words "No Foot-
ball Coaches Allowed" would wonder about the motives for such a peculiar form of discrimi-
nation but would readily assume he understood the meaning of that phrase. But on learning 
that the words are found on a sign in the window of a fast food restaurant outside of Oxford 
in England, and of the different English uses of "football" and "coach," very few people 
would insist on the correctness of their prior understanding. I am grateful to my colleague, 
Jim Lindgren, for suggesting this illustration. Another way to make the same point is to say 
that in this context the standard meaning is different. But once we say that standard meaning 
may vary with context we have come a long way toward saying that any inquiry into meaning 
involves assumptions about the actual speaker's intentions. Context is relevant insofar as it 
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now acquired fresh information about the likely intention of the 
person who has used the words. For instance, we would react dif-
ferently to "Do Not Enter" if we saw it written on a stack of in-
voices beside a computer terminal. Once we have a different idea 
about that intention there is little point on acting on a standard 
meaning that we think no one really intended.1o In our day-to-day 
transactions we are concerned with particular speech acts, with the 
use of language by an agent for a purpose. 11 
This understanding of language use has particular force when 
the language use we are dealing with is enacted law. This brings me 
to the second part of my response. Reference to the intention with 
which a law was created is usually an essential part of the process 
by which we treat certain language as law. Any language meaning 
can be a source of restraint. But the capacity to restrain, by itself, is 
not sufficient to create law. Legal restraint must issue from a legiti-
mate source, regard for that source involves reference to the inten-
tion with which the relevant language was uttered. 
Consider a court's application of a statute to a case before it, a 
statute which arguably controls the outcome. Why does a court 
pay any attention to it at all, in either the sense intended by its 
enactors or in some standard sense of the words themselves? Why 
doesn't it give equal deference to some other form of words found in 
a text book or, for that matter, in a cookbook? The answer usually 
is that the words of the statute were used by certain people on a 
tells us something about the reasons the expression was uttered. SeeP. JUHL, supra note 5, at 
99-109. See also C. ALTIERI, supra note 8, at 147; E. HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 62-63; Grice, 
supra note 8, at 387; Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruc-
tion, 14 CRITICAL INQUIRY 49, 60 (1987). 
10. See P. JUHL, supra note 6 at 106-12. The practical consequences of the contrary 
approach are illustrated by an example Knapp and Michaels give as a part of a larger argu-
ment: "Perhaps the speaker is a passenger in a car that has just pulled up to a railroad 
crossing. He says 'go' but the driver hesitates when she notices that the gate is down and a 
train is approaching. . . . Suppose the driver knows when the passenger says 'go,' he means 
'stop'; nevertheless she insists on taking 'go' to mean what it means according to the conven-
tions of English, that is 'go.' . . . The driver, knowing what he intends, chooses to disregard 
it, preferring instead the conventional 'verbal' meaning. Such a response might seem odd in 
the context of this example, since disregarding the passenger's intended meaning could be 
suicidal." Knapp & Michaels, supra note 9, at 54. See id. at 63. 
II. This idea of a speech act as a purposive action, as a way of doing something, is 
generally associated with Wittgenstein's later work. See, e.g., L. WJTTGENSTEIN, PHILo-
SOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 20e, 128e, 137e {Nos. 43, 432, 491) (G. Anscombe trans. 1953). 
Charles Altieri has summarized Wittgenstein's position insofar as relevant here: "Wittgen-
stein, unlike the Oxford philosophers, did not trust in language, itself, or in established con-
ventions as the primary object of grammatical analysis. He was careful to link the metaphor 
of language games with the looser one of forms of life because he saw that philosophy's ulti-
mate subject was not the language but the ways men used language." C. ALTIERI, supra note 
8, at 52. See also C. ALTIERI, supra note 8, at 24, 99-102; J. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS 
WITH WORDS 99-121 (2d ed. 1975); Davidson, supra note 8, at 435, 443-46; Graff, supra note 
7, at 408-09. 
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certain occasion following a certain procedure. And we have prior 
binding law which tells the judges that when words are used by 
those people, on that kind of occasion, following those procedures, 
those words are binding law. In developed legal systems, the qual-
ity that makes certain words law is not their location in a certain 
book but the circumstances in which they were uttered.' 2 It is, of 
course only because of those circumstances that someone felt 
obliged to reproduce the words in a statute book at all. The view of 
law I employ here is recognizably positivist. That conception is, in 
some ways, controversial. But when, as here, we are interested in 
whatever legal forces attaches to enactments-constitutions, stat-
utes, regulations-the explanatory power of positivism is particu-
larly strong. 13 
The words of the statute control because they are the manifes-
tation of an authorized act of legislation.'4 A court is controlled by 
"what the legislature did," not by some independent power inhering 
in the words they used. Those words are mere artifacts of the criti-
cal act. Moreover, that critical act is an exercise of human will. 
Irresistibly, therefore when we consider the binding force of law, we 
are drawn to a purposeful human deed. The nature of that deed 
cannot be understood apart from the purpose with which it was 
undertaken.'s The words of a statute or constitution were uttered 
with the intention of giving effect to that will. A statute cannot be 
understood as law apart from the intention with which it was 
enacted. 
It follows from this that an unconscious or accidental use of 
words by the legislature cannot create unintended law. Such utter-
12. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91-96 (1961). There is a sense in which this 
is true not only of legal enactments but of any utterance which is taken as an order. Straw-
son, Intention and Convention in Speech Acts, in PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 23, 35 (J. Searle 
eel. 1971). 
13. Indeed, we commonly refer to such enactments as "positive law" which we define 
exactly as that which is "adopted by proper authority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1324 
(4th ed. 1956). One might argue that positive law does not exhaust law or that positive 
enactment is not sufficient to create law. But once we have agreed that an enactment has 
some legal force we have little choice but to think that that force is a consequence of the 
process of enacting it. 
14. This notion is reflected in the terms we use for statutes including "act," "enact-
ment," and "legislation." In the same way "constitution" may be regarded as the nominal-
ization of the verb, "to constitute." This is a particular instance of the idea mentioned above 
in notes 9-10, that our interest in language use is in its employment as a purposive act. 
15. "[A need to apprehend a speaker's intentions] is always present in discourse, since 
besides grasping what someone means in the sense of what he is saying, we must make out 
why he says it-what relevance he takes it to have, what point he is driving at, and so on." 
Dummett, A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs: Some Comments on Davidson and Hacking, in 
TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF DoNALD DAVID-
SON 459, 474 (E. LePore ed. 1986). 
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ances would not represent the will of the authorized law maker. 
This, and the more general point, are illustrated by an actual case in 
which a court had to construe an admittedly bizarre set of words 
used by the authorized law makers, words whose standard meaning 
could not possibly have coincided with the act of will intended by 
the human beings involved. In Cernauskas v. Fletcher 16 the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas had to construe a statute which dealt 
with the powers of municipalities to vacate streets and alleys. The 
last section of the statute included this perplexing language: "All 
laws and parts of laws and particularly Act 311 of the Acts of 1941 
are hereby repealed." The supreme court must have been extremely 
reluctant to apply this statute in the sense of its standard meaning. 
Indeed the court hardly paused over the matter. "No doubt," the 
opinion asserts, "the legislature meant to repeal all laws in conflict 
with that act, and, by error of the author or the typist, left out the 
usual words 'in conflict herewith,' which we will imply by necessary 
construction .... "17 I doubt whether many people would find this 
decision controversial. Yet it is in patent conflict with statutory 
words which have about as clear a standard meaning as can be 
found in the language. Is 
The assumption that statutes are law because they are expres-
sions of the will of the legislature is itself the application of a rule of 
law. That law is the Constitution. A similar kind of authorization 
may be found in article V for the binding legal character of constitu-
tional amendments. But there is no obvious legal counterpart in the 
case of the original Constitution. This brings us back to the main 
theme. If the Constitution is law, how did it acquire that status? 
Quite clearly it was not created as law in pursuance of some law-
making power established by prior law .19 But this is not to say that 
16. 201 S.W.2d 999 (Ark. 1947). See also Poisson v. d'Avril, 244 Ark. 478A (1968), 
reponed in R. MEGARRY, A SECOND MISCELLANEY-AT-LAW 185 (1973), a more sympa-
thetic treatment of the plain words of the statute, that suspiciously disappeared from the law 
reports after its issuance on April 1. 
17. 201 S.W.2d at 1000. 
18. It is possible to construct a model of interpretation which omits reference to legisla-
tive intentions while still avoiding absurd constructions like that suggested by the statute's 
words in cases like Cernauskas. One such model would look for an intention only in the 
words of the statute but would supplement that intention with requirements that its expres-
sion be rational, intelligible, and institutionally appropriate and that interpretation take place 
in light of a statutory "purpose" which is independent of the intent of the legislators but is 
defined in terms of the assumed "end-state" of the good society. See Moore, supra note 6, at 
259-65. It seems to me that the clear appropriateness of these factors is more naturally un-
derstood as a consequence of our concern with "what the legislature did." They are not 
derived exclusively from the standard meaning of the text. 
19. In fact, the creation of the 1787 Constitution was a rather explicit and conscious act 
of illegality in light of the existing legal procedure for altering the articles of confederation. 
See Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CoNST. CoMM. 57 (1987). 
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the Constitution's status as law is unrelated to the people and cir-
cumstances associated with its creation. 
The Constitution became supreme law as a result of the regard 
in which its rules and the process for making those rules were held 
at the time of its promulgation-that is as a consequence of a widely 
shared political understanding as to the sources and limits of law-
making power. Put too simply, the sequence of the drafting and 
ratification of the Constitution was understood to express the will of 
"the people" in as clear a way as the institutions and traditions of 
that time permitted. And it was a political axiom of that day that 
all laws and constitutions were subject to revision or replacement by 
the sovereign people.2o The critical point for my purposes is that 
the Constitution as law cannot materialize out of the air. We come 
to regard certain language as the Constitution because of something 
about the way it was uttered. Who can disagree with Walter Benn 
Michaels that "[n]o one would even try to interpret the Constitu-
tion if everyone thought it had been put together by a tribe of 
monkeys with quills."2I 
It is my position, therefore, that interpretation of the Constitu-
tion consistently with the intentions of its enactors is inseparable 
from a determination to treat the Constitution as law.22 It is true, 
of course that there are other instances where we treat as legally 
binding speech or writing interpreted not according to the actual 
intentions of the utterer but according to its standard meaning. But 
each of those instances can be explained as consistent with the view 
of constitutional interpretation suggested here. 
One apparent example of adherence to standard meaning is the 
prevailing English practice of statutory interpretation that bars ref-
erence to the legislative history of the enactment at issue.23 It is not 
at all clear, however, that this practice is a rejection of the idea that 
statutes are to be interpreted to effect the intentions of the legisla-
tors. Rather it may be premised on the reasonable idea that the 
standard meaning most often coincides with the intended meaning 
and that it may be wasteful and often misleading to consult the leg-
islative record as further evidence of that intention. Certain fea-
tures of the English approach make this explanation entirely 
20. /d. at 70-75. 
21. Michaels, The Fate of the Constitution, 61 TEX. L. REv. 765, 774 (1982). At least 
we would not try to interpret it as binding legal rules. 
22. The decision to regard the Constitution as law, of course, is not an inevitable one: 
But our legal system seems to have taken that fork irreversibly with the decision and accept-
ance of the decision in Marbury. See Kay, Courts as Constitution-Makers in Canada and the 
United States, 4 SUP. Cr. L. REV. 23 (1982). 
23. SeeR. WILSON & B. GALPIN, MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 
26-27 (lith ed. 1962). 
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plausible. It is well established that courts are to construe with ref-
erence to the mischief that Parliament set out to correct,24 a maxim 
that only makes sense if the aim of construction is to follow the 
legislative intention. Similarly, courts must avoid an interpretation 
which would lead to a manifestly absurd result even if that result 
seems to be called for by the standard meaning of the words used.2s 
The job of the interpreter, therefore, seems to be to search for some-
thing of which the standard meaning is merely evidence. When that 
evidence turns out to be defective it loses whatever force it 
possessed. 
The same explanation is even clearer with regard to the weaker 
counterpart of the English approach once prevalent in this country: 
the "plain meaning rule" of statutory interpretation. This rule pre-
cludes reference to extrinsic aids to construction, including legisla-
tive materials, where the meaning of the statute is clear and 
unambiguous on its face.26 It permits use of those aids, however, as 
soon as the language is ambiguous; as soon, that is, as there is no 
standard meaning. Presumably, in such cases the language, itself, is 
insufficient evidence of the meaning of the statute and requires sup-
plementation. But as that supplementation is by recourse to what is 
clearly evidence of legislative intention, it follows that the unambig-
uous text is, itself, viewed as evidence, clear and sufficient evidence, 
of that intention. 
With respect to each of these restrictions on statutory interpre-
tation we might question whether a limitation of the investigation to 
the statutory text is ever the best way to go about discovering in-
tended meaning. In fact, in recent years courts have shown increas-
ing skepticism as to the wisdom of these restrictions.27 My point is 
24. /d. at 66-70. The same source, a standard reference on statutory construction opens 
with these words: "A statute is the will of the legislature, and the fundamental rule of inter-
pretation to which all others are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded 'according 
to the intent of them that made it.'" /d. at 1-2. 
25. SeeS. EOOAR, CRAIES ON STATUTE LAW 86-90 (6th ed. 1963). This rule will yield 
to particularly clear language. "[I]n that case the words of the statute speak the intention of 
the legislature." /d. at 87 (quoting Warburton v. Loveland, D. & Ch. 480, 489 (1832). The 
connection between this rule and legislative intentions is made clear in the following quota-
tion: "[A court should give to statutory words] their ordinary signification unless when so 
applied they produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to con-
vince the court that the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary significa-
tion and to justify the court in putting on them some other signification which though less 
proper, is one which the court thinks the words will bear." River Wear Commissioners v. 
Adamson, 2 App. Cas. 742, 746 (H.L. 1877) (Blackburn, J.) quoted in H. HART & A. SACKS, 
THE LEGAL PROCESS 1144 (tent. ed. 1958). 
26. See 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 73-90, 278 (1943). 
27. The English rule on statutory interpretation has been in increasing disfavor, for 
example, in Canada insofar as it has barred recourse to the drafting history of statutes chal-
lenged as outside the constitutional legislative competence of the enacting legislature, see Re 
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only that neither restriction need be regarded as positing that statu-
tory text alone is authoritative independent of the intention of the 
lawmaker. 
Another area of law where mere text appears to control is that 
of contract. In that field a contract may be concluded when parties 
exchange communications whose standard meanings manifest a 
shared intention to contract even if it is shown that one of the par-
ties never held such an intention.2s Similarly a court is to exclude 
parol proof that the parties to a written contract intended it to mean 
something other than what the "plain, common meaning of the 
words" suggest.29 In practice, however, the standard meanings of 
the words used have not exercised as complete a tyranny over the 
transactions created as these dicta would suggest. Some contrary 
doctrines of interpretation are well established. While the issue 
rarely arises, it is doubtful if courts would really enforce a contract 
that they thought was not intended as such by either party.3o Simi-
larly the equitable device of reformation can be employed to make 
the writing conform to the true intention.3I Parol evidence is al-
ways available to prove such a mistake,32 and, as is the case with the 
plain meaning rule on the construction of statutes, it may be used to 
show the parties' intention when the text is ambiguous. Ambiguity 
is found without much difficulty.33 
The objective interpretation of contracts does result in cases in 
which a contract provision is applied in the teeth of plausible evi-
dence that it was not jointly intended by the parties to govern. This 
Anti-Inflation Act, [1976]2 S.C.R. 373,438-39, 471-72, as well as to the expressed intentions 
of the drafters of the Constitution itself (a statute of the British Parliament). See, e.g., Re 
§ 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.) 1985, 2 S.C.R. 486, 5505-07. The American "plain 
meaning rule" has likewise been vigorously criticized and often disregarded in practice. See 
N. SINGER, supra note 26, at 278; H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 25, at 1267-69. 
28. See Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand, J.), 
aff'd, 201 F. 664 (C.C.A.N.Y. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). 
29. Attorney-General v. Shore, II Sim. 592, 615 (1833-34), quoted in J. MURRAY, 
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 241 n.77 (1974). 
30. See Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194,201-02 (1934) (dicta). This result would seem to 
follow a foniori from the rule that no contract exists when parties non-negligently attach 
different meanings to their purported expressions of assent. See Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864] 
2 H. & C. 906 (the "Peerless" case); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Of CoNTRACTS § 20(1) 
(1979); see also Berke Moore Co. v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 98 N.H. 261 (1953) (interpreting 
contract according to mutual understanding of parties even where inconsistent with standard 
meaning). But cf I S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW Of CONTRACTS§ 95 (3d ed. 
1957) (Commenting on the objective approach to interpretation of contract terms: "It is even 
conceivable that a contract may be formed which is in accordance with the intent of neither 
party.") 
31. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Chapman, 182 Md. 208 (1943); E. FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS§ 7.5, at 471 (1982). 
32. Hoffman, 182 Md. at 210-11; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at§ 7.5, at 471-72. 
33. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at§ 7.12, at 501-02. 
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kind of question, however, only tends to arise in cases where one 
party subsequently claims that he held an understanding which is 
inconsistent with the standard meaning, while the other maintains 
that the standard meaning expresses the intention he has always 
held. If both parties are believed, contractual liability cannot attach 
as a result of a "meeting of the minds." But it does not follow that 
liability is imposed because the standard meaning of the contract 
language has some independent legal force. Rather such liability 
may follow from a judgment that it is proper to impose the cost of 
the misunderstanding on the party who acted carelessly by employ-
ing, without adequate explanation, words whose standard meaning 
differed from his intention. Where there is no such carelessness no 
liability is imposed.34 It may not be entirely irrelevant that our 
modem action for breach of contract has roots in the general law of 
tort.3s 
This explanation of the objective theory of contract formation 
and interpretation may illuminate another important feature of con-
stitutional interpretation. The use of standard meanings in conflict 
with the parties' intentions in contract is the application of a policy 
inherent in the common law concerning the rights and duties of 
contracting parties. There is a sense in which a contract is itself 
law, but the creation and effect of that law is governed by prior and 
superior law.36 In the same way we might have a constitutional rule 
requiring statutes to be interpreted in accordance with the standard 
meanings of their words even when that was contrary to the legisla-
ture's intended meaning. But for reasons already noted37 that can-
not be the case with constitutional interpretation. By definition, 
34. See supra text accompanying note 30. In a well-known article, one writer noted 
that the proposal for the first Restatement of Contracts conceded three exceptions to the 
objective theory of contract formation: "[O]ne is not bound by his 'objective' assent (a) where 
he is non-negligent, (b) where both are negligent, or (c) where his negligence has not misled 
the other. These are not merely slight variations. On the contrary it is believed that by far 
the greater number of negotiations which do not result in actual meeting of the minds fall 
under these exceptions." Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CAL 
L. REv. 441, 444 (1929). The same writer suggested that contract doctrine would more 
clearly represent the underlying policies if it maintained the requirement of subjective assent 
for contract liability and made negligent and misleading use of language in contract negotia-
tions actionable in tort. /d. at 442. See also C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 66-67 (1981); 
Knapp & Michaels, supra note 9, at 63. 
35. See Ames, The History of Assumpsit, in SELECTED READINGS OF THE LAW OF 
CONTRACT 33 (1931). 
36. "The party ought to direct his meaning according to the law and not the law ac-
cording to his meaning, for if a man should bend the Jaw to the intent of the party, rather 
than the intent of the party to the law, this would be the way to introduce barbarousness and 
ignorance and to destroy all learning and diligence." Throckmorton v. Tracy, 75 Eng. Rep. 
221, 251 (K.B. 1559). 
37. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22. 
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there is no positive law-behind-the-law which controls the creation, 
interpretation, and application of the Constitution in the way the 
common law does for contracts or a constitution might for statutes. 
The legal character of the Constitution is not attributable to prior 
law but to the pre-legal and pre-constitutional complex of social, 
historical, and political forces which give it legitimacy.Js That fact 
makes it difficult to see the Constitution as anything other than the 
continuing effectuation of the act of will which is responsible for its 
legal status. 
It is possible, of course, that the things which made the Consti-
tution law in 1789 are not the things which make it law now .39 
While regard for the people and processes that enacted the Consti-
tution may explain why it came to be accepted as law in the first 
place, it may be that those reasons have been replaced.40 In con-
temporary society the political reasons underlying the status of a 
constitution as law may be of a kind that do not require an interpre-
tation that refers to the intentional acts of the constitution-makers, 
but instead point to the constitution's standard meaning. But what 
could those reasons be? 
The most convincing political justification for treating the stan-
dard meaning as law concerns the values of clarity, predictability, 
and stability. The virtues of constitutionalism, as I have noted, in-
volve the creation of restraints that limit the ability of government 
to interfere arbitrarily in private decisionmaking and planning. 
Those limits are less useful to the degree that their content cannot 
be known in advance. The standard meanings, it is supposed, are, 
almost by definition, clearer, that is more available, than the origi-
nal intentions.4I 
It must first be noted what limited consequences acknowledg-
ment of this justification would have. It would only effect the inter-
pretation of those constitutional provisions that have a standard 
meaning. As soon as we reach a provision which, on its face, sup-
ports more than one plausible meaning it would indicate no pre-
ferred interpretation. That would be the case with the most prolific 
sources of modem constitutional controversy, the due process 
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Only if, for example, 
we discovered that the provision for two senators from each state 
38. See Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO S. L.J. 187, 188-93 (1981); see also 
Strawson, supra note 12, at 36 (distinguishing illocutionary acts which are essentially conven-
tional and those not essentially conventional). 
39. Kay, supra note 19, at 75-80. 
40. SeeK. 0LIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT 103 (1971). 
41. Moore, supra note 4, at 258. 
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were really intended to result in say, three or five senators from 
some states would the rule give an answer and be of any conse-
quence. As the example given shows, this will rarely happen. 
But even putting such practical considerations aside, an argu-
ment that availability of meaning provides a justification for apply-
ing the standard meaning is obviously incomplete. Completing it, 
moreover, seems to draw us back irresistibly to the intentional act 
of the constitution-makers. This is because availability cannot, it-
self, tell us why we pay attention to the standard meaning of this 
particular text. We can find lots of texts whose meanings are clear 
and available-from the National League rules to the Manhattan 
telephone directory. We look to a constitution because it is already 
regarded as law and that brings us back to the process by which it 
was created, to the will of the constitution-makers. 
It is possible, I suppose, to construct a sort of hybrid justifica-
tion. It would concede that the Constitution, at one time, had the 
status of law because of the events of its creation. But at some point 
the justification changed to that of the desirability of clear and 
available rules. And the 1789 constitutional text was a convenient 
source of those rules given its prior acceptance. (Since that accept-
ance was a result of the circumstances of its creation, even here we 
see the apparently inextirpable appearance of the constitution-mak-
ers.) But this qualified explanation is so artificial as to make us 
doubt it really tells us anything about the reasons the Constitution 
continues to be viewed as binding law. When we compare it to our 
popular romance with constitution-makers, made so plain in our 
recent bicentennial celebrations, it looks implausible indeed. 
Perhaps it is appropriate to close by reiterating the limited 
character of the argument I have made here. I have, in no way, 
brought into issue those approaches to constitutional adjudication 
which appeal to standards that are partially or totally independent 
of the text of the Constitution, however interpreted. In particular, I 
do not intend to argue that such approaches necessarily lack quali-
ties which are essential to their designation as rules of law. I only 
mean to suggest that to the extent we would bind ourselves, in 
whole or in part, to rules inferred from mere marks and letters on 
paper without reference to the will of the human beings who se-
lected those marks and letters, we enter a regime very foreign to our 
ordinary assumptions about the nature of the law. 
